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Regional Biopolitics 
Joe Painter, Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, UK, DH1 3LE 
j.m.painter@durham.ac.uk 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to bring ideas about biopolitics and its associated political 
technologies to bear on the variety of regional geographies that affect the practices of 
governing populations today. After outlining some of the ways in which 
populations and their characteristics feature as matters of governmental concern, the 
paper then briefly summarizes Foucault’s account of biopolitics and its association 
with the formation of national population and nation-states. While there are good 
reasons why discussions of biopolitics have tended to emphasize the national scale, a 
full account of biopolitical practices would also attend to the complex spatialities of 
populations and government. Drawing on Stephen Legg’s scalar account of the 
relationship between population, biopolitics and government the paper considers 
the tentative emergence of what might be termed regional biopolitics in 
contemporary Europe. Recent changes in workforce skills policy in the UK provide a 
case study to examine how a typical biopolitical concern (the skill levels of the 
population) relates to the rise and subsequent fall of regional governance in England. 
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Introduction 
This paper seeks to re-cast the practice of regional economic governance as, in part, 
an exercise in biopolitical power. Following Michel Foucault (2004, 2009), biopolitical 
power concerns the management and regularization of populations in relation to 
their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Foucault argued that the 
government of a population, rather than of the individual subjects within it, involves 
a distinctive form of power. While disciplinary power focuses on the individual 
body, biopolitical power focuses on the mass of the people as a collective with its 
own specific characteristics (growth rate, fecundity, vitality, morbidity and so on). 
Whereas Foucault’s account of biopolitics focused primarily on the politics of 
national populations, the rise of regional economic governance in Europe in the late 
twentieth century led to growing political concern with the characteristics of 
populations at regional and sub-regional scales, resulting in the emergence of what 
might be termed ‘regional biopolitics’. 
 
Population geographers have, of course, long been interested in sub-national 
variations in populations such as regional and local differences in birth and death 
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rates and inter-regional migration patterns, and they have developed sophisticated 
statistical models to analyse these (eg REES and CONVEY, 1984; REES and 
KUPISZEWSKI, 1999). However a focus on biopolitics offers a rather different 
perspective in which demographic models and statistical knowledge are understood 
not as transparent windows onto pre-existing social realities, but more as lenses – 
political technologies that actively constitute and selectively shape the phenomena 
they portray. Statistics, models, forecasts, maps and graphs are performative as well 
illustrative: the selection and linking of variables, the drawing of boundaries, and the 
making of assumptions have the effect of bringing certain features of the world into 
focus (sometimes even into being) at the expense of others. 
 
Understanding population politics as biopolitics also draws attention to the moral 
concerns that frequently underpin population policies. On the one hand, modern 
states’ claims to political legitimacy are intimately linked to concern for the health, 
prosperity, fulfilment and happiness of their populations. On the other, state 
practices have historically reflected intense anxieties about the possible deterioration 
of the national character, the need to preserve the national culture and way of life, 
the implications of immigration and racial mixing, and threats to the fitness, virility, 
productivity and moral fibre of the population. As a result both the quantitative and 
qualitative attributes of the population are the focus of almost constant 
governmental concern. The attributes in question commonly include the size of the 
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population; its age profile; its nutritional status, health and fitness; its aptitude for 
work; its levels of education, skill and productivity; its capacity for creativity, 
innovation and entrepreneurialism; its ethnic, racial and religious composition; its 
sexual conduct; its happiness and subjective well-being; its cultural affinities; and its 
political restlessness. Nowadays many of these attributes are monitored and in some 
cases governed and managed at sub-national as well as national and occasionally 
supra-national spatial scales. Drawing on the work of Legg (2005, 2009), this paper 
will examine the biopolitics of regional economic governance using a case study of 
skills policy in the UK. 
Population Politics as Biopolitics 
Foucault dates the emergence of biopolitics to the second half of the eighteenth 
century (FOUCAULT, 2004, p. 241-2). He contrasts biopolitical power with the 
disciplinary form of power that had developed a century or more earlier and which 
formed the focus of much of his earlier research on institutional spaces such as the 
clinic and the prison. Disciplinary techniques were ‘essentially centred on the body’ 
and 
 
included all devices that were used to ensure the spatial distribution of 
individual bodies (their separation, their alignment, their serialization, and 
their surveillance) and the organization, around those individuals, of a whole 
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field of visibility. They were also techniques that could be used to take control 
over bodies. Attempts were made to increase their productive force through 
exercise, drill, and so on. (FOUCAULT, 2004, p. 242) 
 
The new technology of power, by contrast, is not disciplinary. It does not displace 
disciplinary power but ‘does dovetail into it’ (p. 242). This ‘non-disciplinary power is 
applied not to man-as-body but to living man, to man-as-living-being’. Thus 
 
the new technology is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent 
that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that 
they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes 
characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.  (FOUCAULT, 
2004, p. 242-3) 
 
For Foucault, ‘this new technology of power, this biopolitics’ is concerned with such 
issues as fertility and mortality rates, lifespan, ageing, disability and morbidity, with 
the health or illness of the population as whole, with epidemics, public hygiene and 
the effects of the environment, in both its natural and artificial guises (p. 243-5). 
 
Foucault makes three observations about the new biopolitical form of power. Firstly, 
whereas disciplinary power is focused on the individual body, biopolitics is 
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concerned with the ‘population’. In fact it is with the emergence of biopolitics that 
the concept of ‘population’ really comes into being as a political problem and object 
of government. Secondly, the matters of concern to biopolitics—disease, mortality 
etc.—’are collective phenomena which have their economic and political effects, and 
[…] become pertinent only at the mass level’ (p. 246). While unpredictable for 
individuals, at the collective level these phenomena are more constant (and thus by 
implication more amenable to government). Thirdly, and related to this, biopolitics 
uses ‘forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures’ and thus involves 
intervention at the level of generality to ‘achieve overall states of equilibriation or 
regularity’ (p. 246), rather than the mechanisms associated with disciplinary power. 
 
Foucault argues that adjusting mechanisms of power to the ‘phenomena of 
population’ required ‘complex systems of coordination and centralization’ which 
only became possible in the late eighteenth century (FOUCAULT, 2004, p. 249-50). In 
other words, management at the level of population requires novel forms of 
technical expertise and it is only the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of the 
eighteenth century onwards that enables (and requires) such governmental 
innovation. As this paper will show, today new forms of political technology and 
new political rationalities have made possible further reconfigurations of biopolitical 
and disciplinary power at both national and sub-national geographical scales. 
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Spatializing biopolitics 
The emergence of biopolitics was thus intimately connected with the ongoing 
formation of the nation-state. The population that, quite literally, comes into being 
through the process of governmentalisation, is constituted first and foremost as a 
national population. The society that ‘must be defended’ (FOUCAULT, 2004) is above 
all a national society. The characteristics of the national population came to be the 
focus of national public concern and nation-state policy. However, it is not inevitable 
that the national must remain the sole unit of biopolitical accounting and 
increasingly geographers and others have begun to develop more fully spatialized 
accounts of biopolitics (for a review see SCHLOSSER, 2008). 
 
An early exercise in regional biopolitics can be found in past debates about the racial 
composition of the population In the second half of the nineteenth century racial 
theories were used not only to bolster assumptions of European superiority vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world, but also to analyse the geographical distribution of ‘racial’ 
variation within Europe. Anthropological studies such as John Beddoe’s The Races of 
Britain (1885) and William Ripley’s The Races of Europe (1900) documented in 
painstaking detail the supposed physiological and phenotypical variations between 
different groups (WINLOW, 2001, 2006). As Young notes, the Victorians were ‘far 
more preoccupied with a complex elaboration of European racial differences and 
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alliances than with what they perceived to be the relatively straightforward task of 
distinguishing between European and non-European races’ (YOUNG, 2008, p. 13). 
Beddoe’s study was compiled over 20 years of observation conducted throughout 
Britain and Ireland. He devised a formula to calculate the ‘index of nigrescence’ for 
difference localities which could then be mapped (BEDDOE, 1971, p. 162-3) leading 
him to conclude that in some regions the English were being literally ‘denigrated’ as 
a result of the increasing population of the ‘darker’ working classes and Celts 
(YOUNG, 2008, p. 135-8). 
 
Racism is integral to Foucault’s account of biopolitics (FOUCAULT, 2004, p. 254-63), 
albeit mainly in relation to the national scale. However, as Stephen Legg has pointed 
out, Foucault did have ‘an ongoing, if indirect, fascination with scalar politics’ and 
emphasised both the ‘scaling-out of discipline to broader scales and the scaling-in of 
government onto individual conduct of conduct’ (LEGG, 2009, p. 239). In an earlier 
discussion of ‘Foucault’s population geographies’ Legg suggests that Foucault’s 
work often demonstrates a ‘somewhat lax attention to detail in terms of regional or 
national difference and periodisation’ (LEGG, 2005). In a series of papers Legg (2005, 
2006, 2008, 2009) has sought to build on Foucault’s account to develop a more 
geographically sophisticated account of the relationships between population, 
biopolitics, government and scale. Legg’s approach to scale is unusual because it 
eschews the conventional ‘nested hierarchy’ of local-urban-regional-national-
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international (or variants thereof) in favour of a series of five sets of what he terms 
‘scalar practices’. These are subjectification, information collection and 
territorialisation, geopolitical imaginations, state technologies and international 
comparisons (LEGG, 2005, p. 145-6). They do not map onto standard geometrical 
scales, but rather refer to socio-technical practices through which particular scalar 
relations are produced. Legg then goes on to propose five cross-cutting ‘analytical 
categories’ (episteme, identities, visibility, techne and ethos) to provide ‘channels 
through which the different elements of Foucault’s work can be tied together’ 
(LEGG, 2005, p. 149). In a sympathetic commentary Chris Philo (2005) suggests that 
Legg’s approach is ‘thoughtful and potentially useful’ but also sometimes ‘over-
elaborate’ (p. 327) in that it comprises an ‘almost structuralist grid, with socio-spatial 
scales down one side and analytical levels along the other’ (p. 331). However it is not 
necessary to endorse any incipient structuralism in Legg’s account to recognise the 
value of his emphasis on the multiple and intersecting scales through which 
biopolitics works to constitute populations as diverse objects of government. 
 
While Legg’s own empirical work has focused particularly on the international 
(LEGG, 2009) and the urban (LEGG, 2006, 2008) as well as the national, his approach 
is not limited to any particular scale. Rather it lends itself to the analysis of many 
differently spatialized forms of biopolitical government and does not see scales as 
pre-constituted hierarchical levels. The practices of biopolitical government do not 
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simply ‘operate at’ scales that pre-exist them, but serve to constitute diverse 
geographies – whether scalar and otherwise – and their associated populations. 
 
This can be seen in the changing significance of the region in contemporary Europe. 
The governmentalisation of the region has been a marked feature of European 
integration since the 1980s for political, administrative and economic reasons 
(JONES and KEATING, 1995; KEATING, 1998; PAINTER, 2008a). Although there is 
no prospect of either the European Union or sub-national regions supplanting 
member states in terms of sovereign power, it is possible to see the emergence of 
specifically regional forms of biopolitical power in which the population concerned is 
a regional, rather than a national one, and the institutions and process of 
government may also be decentralised or devolved. Biopolitical government 
involves ‘action at a distance’ and a certain reach across geographical space. The 
space in question does not have to be a national territory. If, as Maurizio Lazzarato 
puts it, biopolitics can be ‘understood as a government-population-political 
economy relationship’ (2002, p. 102), then any spatial reconfiguration of the 
government-political economy relationship is likely to involve, and may even be 
enabled by, a spatial re-definition of the relevant population. The process of 
European integration has involved just such reconfigurations, with a strong 
emphasis on the region as the key site and driver of economic growth and 
development. The economic and geographical rationale for this emphasis is 
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contested and debates about the role of regional agglomerations, inter-regional 
competitiveness, regional innovation networks, learning regions, regional social 
capital and the rest will be very familiar to readers of Regional Studies (eg AMIN, 
1998; HUDSON, 2002; SCOTT, 1996, 1998, 2001; STORPER, 1997). For present 
purposes however, the question is not so much whether the EU’s political  
prioritisation of regions is well-founded, but how it relates to the shaping of 
populations and their attributes. 
 
In Europe there is wide variation in the formal powers of sub-national territorial 
authorities. The European Union includes both fully federal and fully unitary states 
as well as states exhibiting varying degrees of regionalisation and decentralisation. A 
full survey of the distribution of powers among governmental levels in all the EU 
member states can be found in a study undertaken for the EU’s Committee of the 
Regions by scholars at the European University Institute (EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTE, 2008). The EUI study demonstrates that there is no consistent Europe-
wide pattern, but that regional authorities often have responsibility for the formation 
and/or implementation of policies in domains such as economic development, 
spatial planning, transport, education, vocational training, employment, culture, 
health, social welfare and environmental protection. Many of these policy domains 
are biopolitical; that is, they have as their focus the relevant population and its 
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attributes. Additionally, policy domains that remain the primary responsibility of 
nation states may nonetheless have a strong sub-national component.  
 
The governmentalisation of the region in relation to biopolitical concerns can be 
understood in terms of Legg’s five scalar practices, which comprise, as the reader 
will recall, subjectification, information collection and territorialisation, geopolitical 
imaginations, state technologies and international comparisons. Firstly, 
subjectification refers to 
 
the process by which one conceives of oneself as a subject, positioned in 
various discourses, for instance, of gender, sexuality, age, class, physical 
ability, but also of citizens’ responsibilities, the need to account and calculate, 
or the urge to reproduce or exercise. How is one encouraged to regulate 
behaviour? What is forbidden or discouraged? Why are these regulations 
necessary in the first place? How are they campaigned against? (LEGG, 2005, 
p. 145) 
 
Clearly processes of subjectification work across many spatial scales. The national 
scale and the scale of the household are of central importance in shaping subject 
positions. However, there are also notable urban and regional variations. Old 
industrial regions are often associated with highly unequal gender relations based 
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around masculinist (and heterosexual) norms, as well as with high levels of class 
consciousness and strong traditions of class solidarity. Global city-regions, by 
contrast, may provide a supportive environment for the expression of sexual 
diversity, but exhibit new forms of class-based exclusion. Citizenship can also take 
specifically regional forms (PAINTER, 2008b) particularly where regional political 
institutions (or regionalist movements) provide a focus for the development of 
political identities at the regional scale. In Europe this can be seen in countries with 
federal constitutions (e.g. Germany), devolved legislatures (e.g. Scotland), and 
regionalist parties (e.g. Italy, Spain, Belgium). 
 
Secondly, information and territorialisation refers to ‘the ways through which 
governments collect information about their territory and form spatial boundaries’ 
(LEGG, 2005, p. 145). The development of statistics played a central role in the 
emergence of biopolitics at the national scale. The collection of population 
information on a regional basis is an essential prerequisite for the emergence of 
regionalised forms of biopolitics. The European Union has invested heavily in the 
collection of regional statistics. Eurostat, the EU’s statistics service, was founded in 
1953 to serve the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to the EU. The 
development of regional policy and the formation in 1975 of the European Regional 
Development Fund saw rapid growth in the need for regional statistics. A 
hierarchical system of territorial units was developed for statistical purposes. Known 
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as NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques), the system allows the 
standardisation of spatial statistics between countries and across policy domains. 
The units correspond to, or are made up of, existing administrative areas within each 
member state. Economic data relating to gross domestic product at the NUTS2 level, 
which comprises areas with a population between 800,000 and 3 million, is 
particularly important for the allocation of grants from the European Regional 
Development Fund. However, data are produced and published across fifteen 
domains including population, labour market, business, education, transport, health 
and agriculture. 
 
Thirdly, geopolitical imaginations relate to the ‘ways in which data are processed and 
presented and the effect on political spaces and identification’ (LEGG, 2005, p. 145). 
An important factor here is the way in which the idea of the region itself has come to 
be associated with Europeanisation. Perry Anderson (1994) has gone so far to 
suggest that the idea of the region was effectively invented as part of the process of 
European integration (see also PAINTER, 2008a, p. 354-5). The routine publication of 
regional statistics and maps helps to normalise the region as an everyday part of the 
socio-economic landscape. Moreover, the presentation of data at the regional scale 
serves to emphasise the degree of socio-economic variation within member states 
and highlights cases where such internal differences are as great or greater than 
those between member states. Cartographic techniques and a cartographical 
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rationality thus underpin core EU policies such as the promotion of ‘territorial 
cohesion’. According to article 174 of the Consolidated EU Treaties, ‘in order to 
promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue 
its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial 
cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the 
levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least 
favoured regions’. The treaties give little clue as to the meaning of the concept of 
territorial cohesion, beyond the aspiration to reduce inter-regional disparities. The 
European Commission therefore published a Green Paper on territorial cohesion in 
an attempt to put some policy flesh on the bare bones of the treaty. Noting that ‘the 
EU harbours an incredibly rich territorial diversity’, the Green Paper suggests that 
 
territorial cohesion is about ensuring the harmonious development of all 
these places and about making sure that their citizens are able to make the 
most of inherent features of these territories. As such, it is a means of 
transforming diversity into an asset that contributes to sustainable 
development of the entire EU. (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2008, p. 3) 
 
The emphasis on endogenous regional assets (‘inherent features’) as the primary 
potential source of regional development is particularly notable here. The green 
paper goes on to assert that ‘increasingly, competitiveness and prosperity depend on 
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the capacity of the people and businesses located there to make the best use of all of 
territorial assets’ (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2008, p. 3). This focus on the 
‘capacity of the people’ located in a particular region and their responsibility for the 
effective utilisation of the region’s assets reveals the biopolitical logic at work here. 
The EU’s routine production and mapping of regional statistics relating to 
population size, density, growth, decline, health, educational participation and 
attainment, employment rates thus operate to underpin the geopolitical imagination 
evident in the notion of territorial cohesion. 
 
Fourthly, state technologies refer to ‘the ways by which the state attempts to influence 
population patterns, whether of reproduction, health, productivity or migration’ 
(LEGG, 2005, p. 146). Such state technologies, which may operate at a variety of 
scales, include land-use planning, interventions in the housing and labour markets, 
infrastructure provision, public health initiatives, education, advertising and 
statutory regulation. For example, immigration policy is generally a matter for 
national governments. However, the impact of migration can vary markedly 
between different regions in the same nation-state. Areas that have suffered from 
population decline and out-migration of skilled workers may benefit from new in-
migrants. Places with labour shortages may also have a distinctive demand for 
migrant workers. Regions with major ports of entry, on the other hand, may face 
challenges providing adequate services for new arrivals. High levels of immigration 
 17 
 
in particular places can lead to pressure on public services and housing markets, and 
to xenophobia. Italy exemplifies these contradictory pressures acutely. Anna Cento 
Bull (2010) shows how Italy’s radical-right Lega Nord party is caught in a tension 
between the economic benefits of immigration to its regional power base in 
industrial Lombardy and its exclusionary anti-immigrant rhetoric. Such 
contradictory pressures help to explain why regionalist parties in Europe vary 
widely in their policies on immigration (HEPBURN, 2009). In the UK, the decline in 
Scotland’s population led to calls for control over immigration policy to be 
transferred from the UK government in London the Scottish parliament in 
Edinburgh. In England the need to manage the impact of immigration at the regional 
scales saw the formation of regional ‘strategic migration partnerships’ charged with 
the promoting the ‘integration’ of migrants in the host region. The management of 
immigration at the urban scale may focus on the enhanced provision of services (for 
example language teaching or culturally sensitive public health activities), but can 
equally involve harsher and more disciplinary measures such as the intense policing 
of immigrant neighbourhoods and, in the case of immigration that is deemed illegal, 
detention and deportation. 
 
Finally, Legg’s fifth ‘scale’, international comparisons, refers to ‘the degree to which 
policies vary between states’, whether ‘culture infuse[s] supposed objective 
categories and practices’ and how international networks are ‘used to discuss and 
 18 
 
undermine state programmes’ (LEGG, 2005, p. 146). The governmentalisation of 
regions in Europe has been a highly internationalised phenomenon. The notion that 
regions are the economic drivers of the global economy has been a central element of 
the process. Regions are exhorted to become internationally competitive and 
encouraged to benchmark themselves against international rivals. Regional 
economic statistics facilitate such comparisons within the EU, though increasingly 
the most challenging competition comes from Asia. A wider perspective is provided 
by the OECD’s programme of territorial reviews which assess the economic 
performance of cities and regions in OECD member states against global 
comparators. International networks of regions, also provide opportunities for 
comparison (and collaboration). For example in 2008 the International Regions 
Benchmarking Consortium was established comprising ten major metropolitan 
regions drawn from Asia, Australia, Europe and North America. Based in Seattle 
and funded by Boeing and Microsoft, the consortium’s aim is to enable the member 
regions ‘to compare and learn from each other through economic and social data 
statistics and in-depth research into specific issues of common interest’.1 
 
As this brief assessment suggests, the five sets of scalar practices identified by Legg 
reveal some of the complexities in the population-biopolitics-scale relationship. 
Consistent with Foucault’s original formulations the national population remains a 
central focus for the exercise of biopolitical power, just at the individual body 
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continues to be subject to various forms of disciplinary power. At the same time, the 
European, regional and urban scales are also important and in some policy domains 
have become more significant over time. To examine this variable geometry of 
biopolitics in a little more depth, the remainder of the paper will consider the case of 
labour market governance, and specifically the changing spatiality of skills policy in 
the UK. 
 
UK skills policy: the rise and fall of the region 
Regions have long been recognised as important spatial units in relation to labour. 
Historically, urban regions corresponded approximately in size to the typical 
maximum daily commuting distance associated with the available means of 
transport of the era. As David Harvey has shown, this has profound implications for 
governance and politics (HARVEY, 1985). There are strong pressures arising from 
urbanisation towards the localisation of labour market regulation – though in the 
second half of the twentieth century these were matched or exceed in many 
advanced industrialised economies by the countervailing pull of national systems of 
collective bargaining, social protection and vocational training. In many countries 
those national systems have weakened markedly. The welfare state has been 
restructured, often in ways that emphasise local variation. At the same time, changes 
in production systems have enabled the emergence of new industrial districts in 
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some sectors, leading some commentators to identify the region as the primary scale 
for the organization of economic activity under conditions of globalization (eg 
SCOTT, 1998; STORPER, 1997). The neo-liberal economic orthodoxy of the 1980s and 
1990s also asserted the benefits (for capital) of a move away from national systems of 
labour regulation. These tendencies may be mutually reinforcing. For example, 
greater sectoral specialisation at the regional level (as suggested by the new 
industrial districts literature) is consistent with regional divergence in the mix of 
workforce skills and knowledge and wage rates and structures. Indeed workforce 
skills have become a key component of increasingly geographically differentiated 
forms of labour market governance. 
 
Although it is rarely written about in these terms, skill is intimately related to 
biopolitics because it is concerned with the qualities – mental and physical – of the 
economically active population. Foucault argues that political economy is concerned 
not only with the government of “natural resources, the products of labor, their 
circulation and the scope of commerce” but also with the “the number of inhabitants, 
their life span, their ability and fitness for work” (FOUCAULT, 1980). The issue of 
skill, which falls under ‘ability and fitness for work’, is thus a matter of pressing 
concern to government. Moreover, within neo-liberal ideology, a key aim of 
economic policy is not to manage the provision of employment directly or even to 
promote full employment at all, but simply to ready the labour force for 
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employment (or ensure that it readies itself). While governments have been long 
concerned with the general education of the population,  skills in the traditional 
sense of proficiency for specific occupations were more often regarded as a matter 
for individuals, employers, trade unions and business associations. 
 
Indeed, past usage tended to associate skill levels with specific occupations. Thus 
jobs involving manual labour were traditionally classified as skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled. ‘Skilled’ or craft jobs were those involving high levels of dexterity and 
precision, but also considerable decision-making. So-called unskilled occupations 
were those that required much less training or practice and which involved very 
limited decision-making and little, if any, autonomy. Access to craft occupations was 
traditionally guarded jealously by workers themselves, originally through guilds 
and the apprentice system and then through trade unions, which often sought to 
regulate qualifications and employment rights. 
 
In due course skill came to be seen as a quality of the worker, as much as the 
occupation, and today, skill seems to be a much more general attribute with the 
result that the descriptions ‘high skill’ and ‘low skill’ are now applied not only to 
occupations and workers, but also to collective entities such as labour markets, 
workforces, populations and even to whole economies, regions or countries. Until 
the 1990s, the academic literature on the concept of skill was largely concerned with 
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manufacturing industry and with manual occupations (for a review, see VALLAS, 
1990). Debates about skill were traditionally focused on the impact of technological 
change in the manufacturing process. By contrast, feminist writers, in particular, 
have argued that definitions of skill relate more to the value ascribed to particular 
occupations (and the people doing them) than to the actual content of jobs (e.g. 
MCDOWELL, 1991; PHILLIPS and TAYLOR, 1980). To date, however, there has 
been relatively little research on the implications for understandings of skill of recent 
changes in the nature of capitalism: the rise of knowledge and creative industries, 
the growth in low-wage service sector jobs, the seemingly permanent revolution in 
information technology and so on. Yet the idea of skill has changed dramatically in 
UK public policy. As Jonathan Payne puts it: 
 
‘Skill’ has always been a somewhat slippery concept. In the past, however, 
skill seemed a much simpler matter than it does today. In the workplace at 
least, skill tended to be equated with the ‘hard’ technical abilities and ‘know-
how’ of the skilled manufacturing worker or the analytical capacities of the 
scientist or technician. Being a skilled worker usually meant some control 
over one’s work, better pay and more secure employment. Today, ‘skill’ is 
altogether more baffling. There are ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ skills, skills that are 
‘generic’ and ‘transferable’, interpersonal skills, customer handling skills, 
emotional skills, aesthetic skills; even certain forms of behaviour such as 
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motivation and discipline now acquire the label ‘skills’. Almost everything it 
would seem is a skill from thinking and problem solving to the ability to 
smile. (PAYNE, 2004, p. 1) 
 
As Payne notes, this diversification and generalisation of ‘skill’ presents policy-
makers with considerable challenges. However, it is now commonplace for policy 
actors to make becoming a ‘high-skill region’ or developing a ‘high-skill workforce’ a 
core strategic goal. And in Europe it is indeed often the region that is the focus of 
many of these aspirations. As economic development policy has been increasingly 
devolved to regional authorities, the biopolitical characteristics of regional labour 
forces – their health, age, knowledge, innovativeness, as well as levels of skill – have 
become a matter of great concern to regional actors and institutions. Economic and 
politically powerful regions, such as the ‘Four Motors’ group (Lombardy, Rhône-
Alpes, Baden Württemberg and Catalonia), emphasise knowledge exchange, 
innovation and creativity in line with the ‘learning regions’ model. In 1991 three of 
the regions in the Four Motors group established the Foundation of European 
Regions for Research in Education and Training.2 Known by its French acronym, 
FREREF now comprises 17 member regions and works to promote the role of the 
region in lifelong learning and to facilitate interregional cooperation in the provision 
of training and skills development. EARLALL (European Assembly of Regional and 
Local Authorities for Lifelong Learning) has similar objectives, and comprises 23 full 
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members.3 The establishment and activities of these networks testifies to the role of 
regional government in education and skills provision in many European countries. 
 
The UK, however, presents a more complex picture than is implied by the dominant 
European narrative of regionalisation. The New Labour government that came to 
power in 1997 introduced devolved government in Scotland, Wales and (eventually) 
Northern Ireland, along with an elected assembly for London. Regional 
development agencies and appointed regional assemblies with members drawn 
from local government and the private, public and voluntary sectors were 
established in the English regions outside London. In addition, a number of central 
government functions had previously been transferred to regional ‘Government 
Offices’ under the previous Conservative government. However proposals to 
establish elected regional assemblies in England were abandoned after the first 
referendum on the issue was heavily defeated in the North-east in 2004. In the wake 
of the failure of regional devolution in England, the emphasis increasingly shifted to 
the development of city-regions – functional economic areas defined by major urban 
labour markets. Outside London, England was left with a halfway house of 
administrative devolution and a regional tier of unelected governmental agencies 
with responsibility for planning, economic development and the coordination and 
delivery of a range of social, economic and environmental programmes. As a result 
of these changes, the policy landscapes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
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diverged from that in England. The three devolved administrations were given 
responsibility for education, training and skills in their jurisdictions, while the UK 
government retained responsibility for these policies in the case of England. Within 
England the New Labour government adopted a multiscalar approach to skills 
policy. A national policy framework was developed with centrally mandated targets, 
while the regional agencies were charged with identifying regional skills priorities 
and developing regional skills strategies. However, following the 2010 General 
Election the new Conservative-led Coalition government lost no time in dismantling 
the architecture of Regional Development Agencies and regional Government 
Offices in England. Regions were dismissed as ‘artificial’ entities that did not reflect 
‘natural economic areas’ (HM GOVERNMENT, 2010, p. 8 & 12). In their place has 
come an emphasis on functional city-regions and localism. Work on the regional 
skills strategies was halted in England, though the skills strategies developed for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland remain in place. 
 
The New Labour government’s approach to skills requirements was shaped by the 
Leitch review published in 2006 under the title Prosperity for all in the global economy – 
world class skills. The UK performs relatively poorly in international comparisons of 
workforce skills . Leitch recommended targets for improving skills at all levels from 
basic numeracy and literacy, to the skills associated with ‘level 4’ (degree level) 
qualifications. The report recommended a ‘demand-led’ approach to training, with 
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the ‘demand’ coming from individuals and employers. There is no attempt to 
identify the specific substantive content of the skills that will be required in future. 
This is partly because ‘history tells us that no one can predict with any accuracy 
future occupational needs’ (HM TREASURY, 2006, p. 13) and partly because of the 
aim of moving from a supply-driven to a demand-led approach. Although the report 
recognises ‘it is possible to have skills without having qualifications’ (HM 
TREASURY, 2006, p. 28), in practice the focus throughout is squarely on 
qualifications as a proxy for skills. The working assumption that skills = 
qualifications is problematic, though one rationale offered is that employers use 
qualifications in assessing candidates for employment, so that accredited skills are 
the ones that matter if the aim is to meet employer requirements. 
 
The Leitch report also noted that a lack of so-called ‘soft skills’ is a particular 
problem for UK employers, as reported in the 2005 National Employer Skills Survey: 
 
Employers in the survey felt that soft skills were lacking (particularly team 
working and customer handling skills, each of which were mentioned as 
lacking in one half of all workers lacking proficiency). Technical, practical or 
job-specific skills were seen to be lacking in over two fifths of employees with 
a skills gap. Other generic, soft skills such as oral communication, problem-
solving and written communication skills were the next most commonly 
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reported skills gaps. A lack of literacy and numeracy skills were each present 
in one fifth of reported skill gaps. The Confederation of British Industry’s 
(CBI) recent Employer Trends Survey found that employers place the highest 
priority for training on leadership and management skills. (HM TREASURY, 
2006, p. 41) 
 
This perceived lack of soft skills is a longstanding feature of the UK labour market. 
According to Payne, under the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) introduced in the 1980s 
 
‘skill’ was detaching itself from particular occupations and moving far 
beyond its traditional association with the specific technical facilities of the 
skilled manual worker. Training for the young unemployed now 
encompassed a range of generic ‘social and life skills’ , ‘communication skills’ 
, ‘reasoning skills’, ‘survival skills’ and ‘problem solving skills’ . Moreover, in 
so far as these were aimed specifically at the cognitive, social and personal 
effectiveness of the trainee, they could not be distinguished from an attempt 
to construct a particular worker-subject replete with certain desirable values, 
attitudes, behaviours and dispositions. (PAYNE, 2000, p. 356) 
 
Payne’s insight supports Foucault’s insistence that disciplinary power has been 
supplemented rather than supplanted by biopolitical power. The exercise of 
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biopolitical power at the collective (population/workforce) level has disciplinary 
effects at the level of the individual ‘worker-subject’. This is particularly true at the 
‘lower’ end of the labour market where training and skills, as the work of Gordon 
Lafer shows in the case of the United States. Lafer questions the direct value of job 
training in conditions of high unemployment and weak demand for labour and 
argues that the principal effects of supply-side interventions are disciplinary 
(LAFER, 2002, 2004; see also PECK, 2001). Others have made similar arguments for 
the UK (SUNLEY et al., 2006). 
 
The Leitch report noted that economic inequalities between the regions and nations 
of the UK have persisted despite overall economic and employment growth and that 
these inequalities are higher than the European average (HM TREASURY, 2006, p. 
35). According to Leitch, ‘skills are a key driver of fairness, ensuring that everyone 
can share in the benefits of growth, reducing inequalities and helping ensure no 
group, region or area is left behind’ (p. 35). Moreover, inter-regional inequality is 
partly explained by ‘the different skills mixes of each region and country of the UK’. 
Regional skills mixes ‘differ for a number of reasons, including the lower attainment 
of qualifications by young people in some areas and the fact that some of those that 
do gain higher qualifications in some regions move to the south of England, where 
many high skill jobs are currently to be found’ (p. 35). However, Leitch also 
identified great complexity in the implementation of existing skills policy at regional 
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and local levels. This led to fragmented provision and a confusing picture for those 
seeking access to education and training after the age of 16 .   
 
After the publication of the Leitch review, the government made significant changes 
to the governance of skills. In 2008 it established the ‘employer-led’ UK Commission 
for Employment and Skills (UKCES). The Commission was set up to advise 
government, assess national progress in the development of skills, and fund and 
monitor industry-specific skills councils (Sector Skills Councils). The strategic 
priorities for the Commission were to build ‘a more strategic, agile and demand-led 
employment and skills system’, to maximise ‘individual opportunity for skills and 
sustainable employment’, and to increase ‘employer ambition, engagement and 
investment in skills’.4  
 
In October 2009 the UKCES published its expert advice to government which it 
hoped would be the basis of a ten-year consensus on skills policy across the UK’s 
four nations and across the political spectrum (UK COMMISSION FOR 
EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS, 2009). It proposed a simplification of the currently 
highly complex skills landscape in England. While the advice implies that there are 
regionally distinct skills needs and that the framework for skills provision should 
have regional and local components, the details of the simplified institutional 
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arrangements at national, regional and local levels were left as a matter for 
government decision. 
 
The following month the government published a white paper on Skills for growth: 
the national skills strategy. (As skills policy is devolved, ‘national’ here refers to 
England, rather than the UK.) The Regional Development Agencies were to be 
central to the delivery of the national strategy. Each RDA would be required to 
produce a regional skills strategy as part of a new integrated regional strategy: 
 
The regional strategies will be developed and agreed with local leaders in 
each region. The skills strategies will articulate employer demand and set out 
specific skills investment priorities for their region. The skills priorities in the 
regional strategies will inform Ministers’ Annual Skills Investment Strategy 
and how the Skills Funding Agency will fund colleges and training 
institutions to ensure an appropriate supply of skills to meet the national, 
sectoral, regional and sub-regional priorities. (DEPARTMENT FOR 
BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, 2009, p. 36-7) 
 
RDAs were also instructed to draw up ‘regional skills priorities statements’ to shape 
immediate funding decisions in advance of the production of the full regional skills 
strategies. Then, in May 2010, six months after the publication of the Skills for 
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Growth white paper, a General Election saw the Labour Party defeated at the polls 
and the formation of a coalition government of the Conservatives led by David 
Cameron and the Liberal Democrats led by Nick Clegg.  
The new Coalition Government wasted no time in moving to abolish regional 
government in England. According to the incoming Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, 
 
We do not believe the arbitrary government regions to be a tier of 
administration that is efficient, effective or popular. Citizens across England 
identify with their county, their city, their town, their borough and their 
neighbourhood. We should recognise that the case for elected regional 
government was overwhelmingly rejected by the people in the 2004 North 
East Referendum. Unelected regional government equally lacks democratic 
legitimacy, and its continuing existence has created a democratic deficit.5 
 
In October 2010 the government published a white paper on Local Growth: Realising 
Every Place’s Potential, which argued that the target-driven approach of the previous 
government ‘worked against the market’. Moreover, 
 
it was also based on regions, an artificial representation of functional 
economies; for example, labour markets largely do not exist at a regional 
level, except in London. This therefore missed the opportunities that come 
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from local economic development activity focused on functional economical 
areas. (HM GOVERNMENT, 2010, p. 7) 
 
However, despite the government’s antipathy towards regions as a tier of unelected 
government, the white paper acknowledges the importance of sub-national 
differences in economic circumstances, and specifically identifies “the inherent skills 
mix or entrepreneurial tradition of the population” in each place as a matter of 
concern (HM GOVERNMENT, 2010, p. 7). 
 
Although the eight regions of England that became a vehicle for so much New 
Labour policy-making have been consigned to history, the white paper views city-
regions, defined as functional economic areas, as the appropriate basis for the 
promotion of economic development. Although the new government has been keen 
to present itself as adopting a wholly new approach, city-regions had already 
become an important scale of economic governance under the previous 
administration. As such areas are often defined in terms of labour market 
geography, they are, if anything, more fitted to the exercise of biopolitical power 
than their larger predecessors. In place of the Regional Development Agencies, the 
new government has encouraged the formation of new Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs): joint local authority-business bodies charged with promoting 
local economic development. They are often based on city-regions “whose 
 33 
 
geography properly reflects the natural economic areas of England” (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2010, p. 12). It remains to be seen whether LEPs, which are 
required to be self-financing, can succeed in promoting the ‘local growth’ that the 
white paper promises. 
 
Shortly after the publication of Local Growth the new government also published a 
new national skills strategy (DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND 
SKILLS, 2010). While remaining committed the Leitch review’s aspiration to raise the 
skills base of the population to ‘world-class’ levels, the new strategy promises to 
 
abolish the Leitch targets and the machinery of centralised control set up to 
meet them. Providers will be able to supply the type and volume of training 
that is needed in their local area, with increasing flexibility to respond to local 
needs and the demands for quality of learners and employers. 
(DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, 2010, p. 13-4) 
 
The new strategy highlights the role of LEPs, but states that they will have no power 
to direct the provision of skills in their areas. Rather, in a demand-led system it is for 
training providers to “engage with their local enterprise partnership to ensure 
alignment between the economic development priorities and the skills provision 
available locally” (DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, 
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2010, p. 54). The hoped for outcomes of the strategy include “reduced skill 
deficiencies at local, regional or sectoral level, because they are quickly identified 
and tackled, through the demand led skills system” (DEPARTMENT FOR 
BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, 2010, p. 59). The implication, however, is 
that if skill deficiencies do not reduce then the fault will lie with educational 
providers (for being insufficiently responsive) or with learners (for being 
insufficiently demanding). 
 
This kind of approach to skills provision seems to constitute a shift away from a 
biopolitical concern with the population towards a more disciplinary form of power 
focused on the individual. At the same time, though, the strategy touts the benefits 
of improved skills levels in resolutely biopolitical and collective terms: 
 
Skills are an asset of our cultural and community life. They enable people to 
play a full part in society, making it more cohesive, more environmentally-
friendly, more tolerant and more engaged. The benefits to social cohesion 
include reduced crime, greater civic engagement, better health and more 
socially tolerant attitudes towards minority groups. The process of learning 
also has a strong positive impact on mental health and well-being, helping 
people cope better with the stresses of daily life as well as social change. 
(DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS, 2010, p. 30-1) 
 35 
 
 
Skills strategies, scalar practices and regional biopolitics 
The new government announced that it would immediately abandon the 
requirement to produce regional skills strategies and in due course abolish the 
RDAs. However, the regional skill priorities statements produced by the RDAs 
during 2010 provide an insight into the regional geography of skills requirements in 
England and at least the outlines of what the regional skill strategies would have 
offered. 
 
The official identification of regional skills priorities, like other aspects of regional 
economic governance, involves a large element of performativity. By declaring 
certain desired outcomes to be priorities, regional agencies are not merely 
anticipating the future, but seeking to influence it, even to bring it about. Depending 
on the wider policy environment in which they are embedded, the establishment of 
priorities may affect flows of funds, induce organisational change, and incentivise 
behaviour. The knowledge that goes into the production of strategies and statements 
of priorities depends on research, statistical expertise, data gathering, forecasting, 
modelling and so on, as well as theoretical assumptions about the geography of the 
regional economy and labour market. As Barnes (2008) argues, markets and the 
economy do not exist independently of such theories and assumptions, but are 
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brought into existence through their performance (MACKENZIE, 2006). Elements of 
that performance and its multiscalar geographies can be unpacked by examining 
how the regional skills priorities statements exemplify Legg’s scalar biopolitical 
practices: subjectification, information collection and territorialisation, geopolitical 
imaginations, state technologies and international comparisons. 
 
Subjectification 
In the case of the statement for north-east England, subjectification is particularly 
concerned with the promotion of ‘active’ subjects who will take responsibility for the 
development of their own skills. The statement says that individuals are responsible 
for ‘active consumerism [of training] and clear articulation of current and future 
skills needs’  and ‘an active commitment to lifelong learning and flexibility in 
accessing learning and skills’ (SKILLS NORTH EAST, 2010, p. 4). The East of 
England statement speaks of ‘fostering aspiration’ (EAST OF ENGLAND 
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2010, p. 6) and ‘helping individuals to development 
their employability and [...] tackle personal barriers’ (p. 20). In the case of the 
statement for south-west England, the goal of raising individual aspirations is 
identified as the second of the three regional priorities. In particular, 
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the South West has significantly higher numbers of self-employed, part-time 
and temporary workers than other regions. These people, many of whom are 
women, need to be encouraged to raise their aspirations and qualification 
levels. (SOUTH WEST RDA, 2010, p. 4) 
 
As in the statement for north-east England, there is also a strong emphasis on 
encouraging individuals to acquire higher level skills and then to stay in the region 
(SOUTH WEST RDA, 2010, p. 9). This reflects the longstanding problem of the out-
migration of skilled labour from economically weaker regions. These documents 
thus form part of a wider discourse in which young, educated, skilled and 
entrepreneurial people are encouraged to identify with the region as somewhere that 
can offer them a successful future. By contrast in the affluent and high skill region of 
south-east England, the statement highlights the need to raise the skill level of the 
population in order to fill the skills gap that is likely to arise as a result of planned 
restrictions on the international migration of skilled labour into the UK (SOUTH 
EAST ENGLAND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2010, p. 9&17). 
 
Information Collection and Territorialisation 
All the statements rely heavily on the extensive collection of data that is collated, 
aggregated and analyzed at the regional scale. Several of the statements also 
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highlight intra-regional variations in the skills levels and requirements of their 
populations. The statement for north-east England draws on a range of official data 
sources, including the Annual Population Survey and the Labour Force Survey, to 
set out in statistical terms the progress that has been made in developing the region’s 
skills: 
 
The qualifications profile of the North East improved markedly between 2000 
and 2008. The proportion of the working age population with no 
qualifications fell by almost 8%, equivalent to c100,000 people. There was 
equally significant growth in the proportion qualified to Level 4+ (up 7%), 
Level 3 (up 5%) and Level 2 (up 4%). This performance has helped the 
qualification profile of the North East converge towards the national average. 
The proportion of the working age population with either Level 1 or no 
qualifications is now almost identical to the rest of the UK. (SKILLS NORTH 
EAST, 2010, p. 5) 
 
At the same time, it is noted that 
 
the North East demonstrates a persistent deficit in higher level skills. The 
region has a smaller proportion qualified to Level 4+ (5% fewer) and an 
equivalently larger proportion qualified to Levels 2 and 3. Urban / rural 
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differentiation exists in some rural areas one quarter of residents have no 
qualifications, largely due to barriers to access. (SKILLS NORTH EAST, 2010, 
p. 5) 
 
The document then proceeds to anatomise the characteristics of the regional 
population in terms of skill, to identify the specific skills requirements of the region’s 
principal economic sectors and to model future changes in demand for skills relating 
to likely shifts in the region’s population, economic activity and industrial structure. 
A summary of sub-regional variations is set out in an Annex. 
 
The statement for south-west England describes the evidence base for the analysis. A 
key source was research and analysis undertaken by SLIM, the ‘skills and learning 
intelligence module’ of the South West Regional Observatory. A ‘research 
observatory’ was established in each of the English regions to enhance the work of 
the regional agencies by providing evidence and undertaking research. SLIM’s South 
West Regional Employment and Skills Analysis 2010 runs to over 300 pages and 
includes 156 figures and 44 tables of data (SLIM, 2010). It provides a comprehensive 
statistical portrait of the region in relation to the skills and employment status of its 
population, broken down by social group, geographical area, economic activity and 
other variables. The section on skills compares the South-west with the other regions 
of England, highlighting the variation that exists between regions in the proportion 
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of the population that have attained qualifications at different levels. The SLIM 
report is in many ways a quintessential biopolitical document. It seeks to draw 
together knowledge of the population, apply it analytically, and provide the basis for 
policy formation involving the targeting of specific population groups. 
 
Geopolitical Imaginations 
Legg uses the idea of ‘geopolitical imaginations’ to refer to the ‘ways in which data 
are processed and presented and the effect on political spaces of identification’. In 
the regional skills priorities statements a number of such imaginations are at work. 
Firstly, and most obviously, is the framing of the region as a space of identification. 
Although the statements for 2011-12 were published after the 2010 General Election, 
when it had become clear that the regional institutions would be abolished by the 
incoming Conservative-led Coalition Government, they necessarily retain the spatial 
focus on their respective regions. It is also apparent, though, that the new 
government’s ‘localism’ agenda was already having an effect, with the planned 
‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ emerging as the basis of a new geographical framing 
of the skills landscape. Secondly, the statements use data to figure their respective 
regions in relation to discourses of economic competitiveness. The statement for the 
North-east refers to the need for the region ‘to develop an internationally 
competitive skill base’ (SKILLS NORTH EAST, 2010, p. 26). In the East of England 
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region, ‘occupational and sector-specific skills must be world-class to enable the 
region’s employers to be internationally competitive’ (EAST OF ENGLAND 
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2010, p. 5). 
 
Thirdly, intra-regional differences are often highlighted. These are not regions where 
the emphasis is on a homogeneous economy or a singular cultural identity. Diversity 
in economic activity is valued either as an existing characteristic or one to be aspired 
to. At the same time, intra-regional disparities in the level of skills is a frequent 
concern, not least in otherwise prosperous regions such as the South-east: 
 
Areas of deprivation exist throughout the South East. This is particularly 
apparent in coastal areas of north Kent, East Sussex and the Isle of Wight, as 
well as in parts of many urban areas such as Portsmouth, Slough and Milton 
Keynes. These are also significant in small, dispersed pockets, including rural 
areas. In these areas individuals often face multiple challenges including low 
skills, limited accessibility, housing and environmental challenges and poor 
health. (SOUTH EAST ENGLAND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2010, p. 10) 
 
Finally, most of the statements see the production of a highly-skilled regional 
population as a key policy goal. These aspirations are closely linked to discourses of 
economic success, regional vibrancy and orientation to the future and to the 
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attractiveness of the region to entrepreneurial and innovative in-migrants. While 
these goals are widely shared between regions, the specific mix of industries and 
substantive skills involved varies from place to place.  
 
State Technologies 
In Legg’s account, state technologies refer to the means through with the state seeks 
to influence population patterns in relation to, among other things, productivity. 
Under New Labour, national target-setting was one of the principal mechanisms for 
promoting such changes. Labour market policy since the 1980s has frequently been 
characterised as ‘supply side’, meaning that government intervention has been 
directed towards improving the quantity, quality, flexibility of the supply of labour 
(and placing downwards pressure on its price, that is on wages). However, there is 
evidence in some of the regional skills priorities statements of a shift in emphasis 
towards promoting the demand for labour. The North-east’s statement notes that 
 
A higher proportion of the North East workforce is qualified to Level 4 
[degree level] than the occupational structure requires. Consequently, the lack 
of opportunity in the region discourages young people from progressing to 
higher level skills, existing skills are under-utilised and it is difficult to attract 
highly skilled individuals to the region. Achieving economic growth will 
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require a ‘push-pull’ approach, promoting a combination of both rising 
qualifications and stimulating demand for higher level skills. (SKILLS 
NORTH EAST, 2010, p. 8) 
 
Demand for higher level skills might be stimulated ‘by encouraging firms to adopt 
new technologies and innovative practices and employ leadership and management 
techniques to drive up productivity’ (SKILLS NORTH EAST, 2010, p. 8). 
 
The supply of skills is promoted through a complex system of formal qualifications, 
apprenticeships, attainment frameworks, employer training schemes, funding 
programmes and public, private and voluntary sector organisations. Although the 
formal skills frameworks are national in scope, one of the purposes of the region 
skills priorities statements is to allow funding priorities to be shaped to specific 
regional and sub-regional needs. Indeed the statements and related strategy 
documents are themselves an example of state technologies. The identification of 
priorities involves some quite detailed specification of regional requirements by 
industrial sector and skill level. For example, in the North-west there is a need for 
technician level skills in growth sectors, but while the automotive sector ‘may wish 
to focus on Level 2 and 3 skills’, the nuclear sector requires skills at Level 3 and 
above and ‘low carbon renewable will need technical high level skills including 
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science graduates’ (NORTH WEST REGIONAL SKILLS STRATEGY 
PARTNERSHIP, 2010, p. 22-3). 
 
International Comparisons 
In skills policy as in much else, the English regional agencies that were developed 
under New Labour were relatively limited in scope and powers by international 
(particularly European standards). The importance of regionalisation to the project 
of European integration has previously been noted. The elected status of the Welsh 
and Scottish governments confers a legitimacy on them in the eyes of European 
institutions and networks that was lacking in the English regions. For example, in 
the skills domain Wales and Scotland are members of the European Association of 
Regional and Local Authorities for Lifelong Learning. In addition, for all the Leitch 
review’s emphasis on a demand-led approach and the need to avoid top-down 
centrally-determined provision, the overarching framework of skills policy under 
New Labour was avowedly national, reinforcing the fact that the Regional 
Development Agencies were principally delivery vehicles for central government 
policy. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has examined how populations are constituted and governed 
geographically. It has argued, following Foucault, that the problem of population is 
a modern problem that came into being at the end of the eighteenth century giving 
rise to biopolitical power as a new form of power in addition to sovereign and 
disciplinary power. Biopolitics deals with the quantitative and qualitative 
characteristics of populations as objects of political concern. Recent writings on 
biopolitics have often focused on security and the movement of people, reflecting 
wider political anxieties about global terrorism and immigration from poorer parts 
of the world to wealthier ones. In this paper the focus has been on a more mundane 
but still significant aspect of biopolitics – the economic potential and productivity of 
the workforce.  The geographically uneven patterning of the skills and economic 
attributes of the population have been a focus of considerable attention because of 
their implications for spatial disparities in living standards, life chances, the 
functioning of the welfare state and levels of public expenditure. Using Stephen 
Legg’s elaboration of a Foucauldian population geography, the paper examined how 
regional biopolitics arises where population attributes such as skills come to be 
configured at the sub-national regional level through practices of subjectification, 
territorialisation, geopolitical imagination and international comparison via specific 
state technologies. 
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The UK Government’s drive for localism is at any early stage and its full effects will 
not be known for some time. Nevertheless, it is evident that the geographies of 
biopolitics are being reshaped. In England, a formal regional tier of government has 
been abolished and its associated biopolitical practices are being re-scaled. A new 
emphasis on the municipal and metropolitan scales (city-regions) is evident, though 
it appears that these spaces will be governmentalised to a much lesser extent than 
their predecessors. Although the constitutional changes of the late 1990s have led to 
a considerable devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, within 
England government remained highly centralised. Central government retained the 
power to reconfigure the pattern of sub-national government more or less at will. 
 
However the abolition of regional government does not mean the end of regional 
biopolitics. The government of social and economic life has an irreducible 
geographical dimension. Spatial disparities in population change, migration flows, 
demographic structure, health and education as well as skills and productivity, all 
pose serious policy and political challenges. While localism and marketisation may 
give the appearance of reduced state control in the short term, their consequences in 
the longer term are unpredictable and liable to require coordinated policy responses. 
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